The Design Defect Test in Washington: The
Requisite Balance
I.

INTRODUCTION

The early notions of strict liability for injuries caused by
defectively designed products examined the relative "safeness"
of the product. The original analysis required the fact-finder to
determine that the product was "unreasonably dangerous"
before strict liability could be imposed.' The jury typically was
instructed to make the determination of whether a product was
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (emphasis added):
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
See, e.g., Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d
418 (1967) (express adoption of § 402A "unreasonably dangerous" requirement); Suvada
v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (adoption of strict liability
rules that coincide with § 402A); Allen v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 403 S.W.2d 20 (Ky.
1966) (adopting the § 402A "unreasonably dangerous" test); Magnuson v. Rupp Mfg.,
Inc., 285 Minn. 32, 171 N.W.2d 201 (1969) (plaintiff must prove that the defect caused
"unreasonable danger"); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, (Miss. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967) ("test is whether the product is unreasonably dangerous
or not reasonably safe"); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967)
(adopting the § 402A definition of "unreasonably dangerous"); Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon,
217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966) (adopting the § 402A "unreasonably dangerous"
test); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co., 440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969) (liability depends on proof
that push rod is "unreasonably dangerous"); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155
N.W.2d 55 (1967) (adopting § 402A "unreasonably dangerous" test).
Some jurisdictions have abandoned the "unreasonably dangerous" test of § 402A.
See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska
1975) (having the plaintiff prove not only the existence of a defect but also that the
defect made the product "unreasonably dangerous" would place a heavier burden on the
plaintiff); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972) (plaintiff need only prove the existence of a defect, not that the product was
"unreasonably dangerous"); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d
893 (1975) (rejecting the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement).

679

680

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 8:679

unreasonably dangerous through the "consumer expectations"
test. 2 If the jury concluded that a particular product was not as
safe as would be reasonably expected by an ordinary consumer,
then the product was unreasonably dangerous and strict liability
was imposed.
When evaluating the broad concept of consumer expectations, the jury traditionally was asked to make an objective judgment after considering a variety of facts and circumstances.
Considerable judicial and scholarly comment has questioned
whether a jury is fundamentally competent to make the nebulous decision of what consumers generally expect in terms of a
particular product's safety.' Some courts simply decided from
the beginning that a risk-utility balancing test is a more efficient
and accurate method of gauging product safety in design defect
litigation than is the divination of consumer expectations.4
In recent years, courts have moved away from the traditional consumer expectations analysis. The modern view examines product safety through a risk-utility balancing process that
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965):
Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in- this Section applies only where
the defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer. . . . The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it,
with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics.
See, e.g., Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 13 Ariz. App. 305, 475 P.2d 964 (1970) (quoting
comment i "consumer expectations"); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421
(1974) (approving "consumer expectations" jury instructions paraphrased from comment
i); Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970)
(adopting § 402A comment i approach for "ordinary consumer expectations"); Bellotte v.
Zayre Corp., 116 N.H. 52, 352 A.2d 723 (1976) (adopting comment i of § 402A); Skyhook
Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977) (comment i test for "unreasonably
dangerous"); Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974) (adopting §
402A comment i "consumer expectations" test). See also Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher &
Piehler, Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability: From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 347, 354 n.19 (1980) (authors explain four general methods used
by courts to determine "unreasonably dangerous" designs in products) [hereinafter cited
as Twerski, Shifting Perspectives].
3. See generally J. BEASLEY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS
REQUIREMENT (1981). See infra note 75.
4. See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1073 (4th Cir.
1974):
In summary, every case such as this involves a delicate balancing of many factors in order to determine whether the manufacturer has used ordinary care in
designing a car, which, giving consideration to market purposes and utility of
the vehicle, did not involve unreasonable risk of injury to occupants within
range of its "intended use."
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inquires into the reasonableness of the product's design." Washington courts have struggled with the transition from consumer
expectations to risk-utility balancing. The courts in this state
have never applied a pure consumer expectations test, but have
in fact employed a combined consumer expectations/risk-utility
examination.e That is, although juries in Washington have been
instructed to determine whether a product has met the ordinary
consumer's expectation of safety, they have been required to
assess these expectations by weighing a number of risk-utility
factors.'
A perplexing situation is presented when a judge or practitioner asks whether the plaintiff must present evidence regarding each of the factors in the risk-utility segment of Washington's design defect test. Washington courts have failed to
articulate a standard by which a plaintiff can be certain that the
burden of proof for the design defect test has been satisfied. The
question becomes, in this trend towards risk-utility balancing,
how much is enough? Can a jury adequately assess product
safety if a design defect plaintiff offers evidence of only one or
two of the factors in the risk-utility analysis?
This Comment examines Washington's application of the
design defect consumer expectations test. Washington courts
have been inconsistent during the recent transition in products
liability law. A case in point is Conner v. Skagit Corp.," in which
the plaintiff was allowed to proceed with a design defect cause of
action while offering proof of only one factor from the consumer
expectations test. Accordingly, this Comment suggests that
design defect plaintiffs must offer proof of multiple factors that
relate to the issue of defectiveness and reasonableness. This proposal will be discussed in light of regional and national products
liability theory and Washington's new statute, as well as the pol5. See Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in
Design Defect Litigation: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57
N.Y.U. L. REV. 521, 521 (1982) ("The age of 'reasonableness' and risk-utility balancing is
upon us.") [hereinafter cited as Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground]; Twerski, Shifting
Perspectives,supra note 2, at 355 ("The overwhelming consensus among courts deciding
design defect cases is that a risk-utility analysis should be used as either an exclusive or
an alternative ground of liability."). See also infra note 59.
6. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154, 592 P.2d 774, 779
(1975). In Tabert, strict liability was adopted for unreasonably dangerous products that
cause injury. The design defect test set forth was "consumer expectations" with a riskutility analysis. Id. See infra note 33.
7. Id. See infra text accompanying note 32.
8. 99 Wash. 2d 709, 664 P.2d 1208 (1983).
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icies that justify strict liability in design defect litigation.
II.

A.

DESIGN DEFECT STRICT LIABILITY IN WASHINGTON

The Evolution of the Design Defect Test in Washington
In Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co.,9 the Washington State

Supreme Court adopted strict liability for a manufacturer who

sells any product in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" that subsequently causes injury. 10 The Washington State
Supreme Court reviewed prior cases in which the manufacturers
of food products,"' hair coloring," and automobiles13 were held
liable without allegations and proof of negligence. In those cases,
the court did not require the plaintiffs to show specific acts of
negligence when proceeding on the theory of implied warranty. 4
9. 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969). Ann Ulmer received injuries while riding in
an automobile, manufactured by the defendant, that struck a concrete abutment. Ulmer
alleged that the accident was caused by a defect in the automobile and that Ford should
be held strictly liable. The trial court held for the defendant, and Ulmer assigned error
to certain instructions that required the jury to analyze only simple negligence. The trial
court gave instructions on the definition of negligence (instruction 5), on duty and
breach (instruction 7), and on proximate cause (instruction 8). Id. at 524-25, 452 P.2d at
730. Ulmer contended that since her claim was premised upon strict liability, she was not
required to prove any specific acts of negligence. Id. at 525, 452 P.2d at 731.
10. Id. at 530-32, 452 P.2d at 733-35.
11. Id. at 525, 452 P.2d at 731. See Pulley v. Pacific Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 68
Wash. 2d 778, 783, 415 P.2d 636, 640 (1966) (manufacturer of contaminated food product
is liable to whoever is injured even though privity does not exist).
12. 75 Wash. 2d at 525, 452 P.2d at 731. See Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash. 2d
347, 358, 378 P.2d 298, 304 (1963) (manufacturers of cosmetic products containing primary irritants or medically known chemical sensitizers impliedly warrant the
merchantability and fitness for use of their products).
13. 75 Wash. 2d at 526, 452 P.2d at 731. See Brown v. General Motors Corp., 67
Wash. 2d 278, 280, 407 P.2d 461, 462 (1965); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456,
462, 12 P.2d 409, 412 (1932). Both courts held that the respective auto manufacturers
could be held liable on a warranty theory for injuries caused by defects in the autos even
though there was no proof of specific acts of negligence and no privity existed between
the manufacturers and the plaintiffs.
14. 75 Wash. 2d at 527, 452 P.2d at 732 ("Since these cases were decided on the
theory of warranty, in none of them was the plaintiff required to prove negligence on the
part of the defendant.").
This view provided a conceptual basis to expand a plaintiff's theories for recovery to
include strict liability while not requiring that the plaintiff prove individual acts of negligence. Just as in liability based upon an implied warranty, the theory of strict liability
does not examine individual acts of negligence. Strict liability is focused on the quality
and safeness of the product. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS §§ 97-98, at 690-94 (5th ed. 1984). See also Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Greenman was the
first case to articulate the strict liability concept for products. See infra note 26. The
Greenman court explained the relationship between warranty liability and strict
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The court then recited section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,' 5 which imposes strict liability on the manufacturer or seller of a product that causes injury to a user or consumer if the product is in a "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous." 6 This early test imposed strict liability upon the
defendant without proof of negligence, as long as the jury determined that the product was unreasonably dangerous. The focus
was on the entire product, rather than on the defendant's negligence. Finally, the court stated:
Section 402A, insofar as it pertains to manufacturers (and we
are concerned in this case with a manufacturer only), is in
accord with the import of our cases which have been decided
upon a theory of breach of implied warranty and we hereby
adopt it as the law of this jurisdiction."
It was not until 1975, in Seattle-First National Bank v.
Tabert, s that Washington recognized strict liability for a design
defect. In Tabert, Seattle-First National Bank brought a design
defect products liability action against a Volkswagen distributor.19 Seattle-First claimed that "the lack of structural strength
in the front panel '2 0 was the proximate cause of the deaths of
two people who were killed when their Volkswagen bus crashed
into the rear of a truck. In accepting the design defect cause of
action, the Washington State Supreme Court explained that
unsafe designs present a very real danger to consumers.2 The
liability:
Although in these cases strict liability has usually been based on the theory of
an express or implied warranty running from the manufacturer to the plaintiff,
the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law, ...
and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope of its own
responsibility for defective products . . . make clear that the liability is not
one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability
in tort.
Id. at 63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
15. 75 Wash. 2d at 531-32, 452 P.2d at 734. See supra note 1.
16. 75 Wash. 2d at 531-32, 452 P.2d at 734.
17. Id. For a brief yet detailed account of the development of strict liability, from its
early warranty origins to the drafting of the Restatement, see Vandall, "Design Defect"
in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 61,
62-75 (1982).
18. 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
19. Id. at 146, 542 P.2d at 774-75 ("Plaintiff sues as administrator of the estates of a
husband and wife who were killed .
20. Id. at 146, 542 P.2d at 775.
21. Id. at 149-50, 542 P.2d at 776 ("A product may be just as dangerous and capable
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court noted that design defect strict liability was a nationally
accepted rationale for imposing liability and that Washington
would be following the majority view2 2 if the court adopted this
theory in Tabert.
The court next confronted the task of formulating a test for
determining the existence of a design defect. A formula was
needed that would enable a jury to decide whether a particular
product design was so unreasonably dangerous as to be defective. Only then would strict liability be imposed upon the
manufacturer.23
Washington courts had generally followed section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts for basic strict liability analysis. 24 The Tabert court recounted various judicial and academic
interpretations of section 402A. 2 5 The court also evaluated competing design defect tests26 and ultimately delineated a novel
of producing injury whether its condition arises from a defect in design or from a defect
in the manufacturing process.").
22. Id. at 149, 542 P.2d at 776 ("In holding that strict liability does encompass a
design defect we join the prevailing, well-reasoned majority of cases.").
23. Id.
24. See supra note 1.
25. 86 Wash. 2d at 147-54, 542 P.2d at 775-79.
26. Id. at 151-54, 542 P.2d at 777-79. "It is apparent that we have a potpourri of
theories and authorities from which to fashion our criteria, definitions, and limitations."
Id. at 154, 542 P.2d at 779.
Design defect tests vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and within a single jurisdiction over time. Three significant California decisions in products liability law illustrate
the potential for tinkering with design defect tests. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), established the initial test for
strict products liability. Greenman brought an action for injuries sustained while using a
power tool manufactured by the defendant. The California Supreme Court stated that
"[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
causes injury to a human being." Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700. Further,
the court stated that a manufacturer is strictly liable when the plaintiff is injured due to
"a defect in design and manufacture of which [the] plaintiff was not aware that made the
[product] unsafe for its intended use." Id. at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
The California Supreme Court refined the test for strict products liability in Cronin
v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972). In Cronin,
the plaintiff was injured when a metal hasp broke in his delivery truck. The broken hasp
allowed bread trays to slide forward and push the plaintiff through the windshield of the
truck. The court rejected the notion that the plaintiff must follow the language of § 402A
in meeting his burden of proof. "[T]o require an injured plaintiff to prove not only that
the product contained a defect but also that such defect made the product unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer would place a considerably greater burden upon him
than that articulated in Greenman." Id. at 134-35, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at
443. Thus, the Cronin court required proof of a defect, but not proof of an "unreasonably dangerous" character. At least one commentator has noted that the Cronin formula
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test for determining the existence of a design defect.2 7 The court
adopted "consumer expectations" as the test for a design
defect, 25 holding that under the rubric of section 402A an unreasonably dangerous design is equivalent to a defect.2 ' A design
defect would exist by definition if a product was "not reasonably
safe," and evaluation of safeness would depend on the reasonais a minority view and that most jurisdictions at that time accepted the "Restatement
terminology." See W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
771 (7th ed. 1982).
In 1978 the California Supreme Court modified the Cronin test in Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). In this design defect
action, which was based on an injury caused by a "high lift loader," the court outlined a
bifurcated test:
[A] product is defective in design (1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when
used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the plaintiff
proves that the product's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors discussed above, that on
balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.
Id. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40 (emphasis added). The Barker
case, therefore, established a two-prong test requiring either consumer expectations or
cost-benefit analysis, with the burden of proof on the defendant.
Oregon's design defect test illustrates that not all jurisdictions look to "consumer"
or "user" tests. In Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974), the
Supreme Court of Oregon set out a seller-oriented test: "A dangerously defective article
would be one which a reasonable person would not put into the stream of commerce if he
had knowledge of its harmful character.The test, therefore, is whether the seller would
be negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk involved." Id. at 492, 525 P.2d at
1036 (emphasis in original). The Phillips test looks to the manufacturer or seller and
imputes constructive knowledge of the defect.
The Supreme Court of Oregon explained in Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or.
61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978), that before the jury decides what the reasonably prudent manufacturer would have done had he known of the harmful characteristics of the product,
the court must make an initial assessment as to whether the case should be submitted to
the jury. "[Tihe court should balance the utility of the risk against its magnitude in
deciding whether to submit a design defect case to the jury." Id. at 67, 577 P.2d at 1326.
Consequently, Oregon requires the judge to perform a risk-utility balance test prior to
the jury's assessment of a design defect.
27. 86 Wash. 2d at 154, 542 P.2d at 779. The Washington test is novel because it is a
combination of two approaches: consumer expectations and risk-utility balancing. See
infra notes 33-34.
28. Id. at 154, 542 P.2d at 779.
29. Id. "If a product is unreasonably dangerous, it is necessarily defective. The
plaintiff may, but should not be required to prove defectiveness as a separate matter."
Id. The court chose to define a defect in terms of safeness. An unsafe product, according
to the court, is a defective product. Thus, in Washington, a plaintiff does not have to
prove a defective condition as well as an unreasonably dangerous character. Id. The
plaintiff need only prove the product's unreasonably dangerous character, and this, by
definition, establishes the existence of a defect. See id.
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ble expectations of the ordinary consumer."
Under Tabert, if a jury decided, based upon a number of
factors, that a product did not meet the ordinary consumer's
expectations of safety, then the product would automatically be
defective and strict liability would follow." The court set out a
list of factors to be used by juries in ascertaining consumer
expectations:
In determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary
consumer, a number of factors must be considered. The relative cost of the product, the gravity of the potential harm from
the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or
minimizing the risk may be relevant in a particular case. In
other instances the nature of the product or the nature of the
32
claimed defect may make other factors relevant to the issue.
The factors set out by the Tabert court constitute a combined
consumer expectations/risk-utility test.3 While the final goal of
the inquiry is to assess consumer expectations, the jury is
required to perform, en route, a risk-utility balancing test. The
court directed that juries in design defect cases must consider
30. Id. ("This means that it must be unsafe to an extent beyond that which would
be reasonably contemplated by the ordinary consumer."). This test is an interpretation
of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1965). See supra note 2. See also
Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wash. 2d 208, 212, 683 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1984) (citing
Wiseman v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 29 Wash. App. 883, 631 P.2d 976 (1981))
("The consumer has a reasonable expectation of buying a product which is reasonably
safe; if there is something in the design which does not meet that expectation, the design
is necessarily defective.").
31. This assumes the presence of injury and proximate cause. See Lenhardt v. Ford
Motor Co., 102 Wash. 2d 208, 212, 683 P.2d 1097, 1099 (1984) ("As has been made clear
in numerous cases, our jurisdiction utilizes a buyer-oriented approach, and the focus is
on the buyer's expectation. Thus, our rule of strict liability focuses attention upon the
product and not upon the actions of the seller or manufacturer.").
32. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d at 154, 542 P.2d at 779 (emphasis added). The factors in
Tabert should be compared to the factors articulated in Barker for the second prong of
that California test: gravity of danger, likelihood of danger, feasibility of an alternative,
cost of improvements, and adverse consequences to the product and consumer if the
design were changed. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978).
33. See Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 614 (1980) ("Thus to
buttress the comment i approach, some courts have fashioned a consumer expectations
test with a risk-utility base."); id. at 614 n.104 (citing Tabert). See also Twerski, Shifting Perspectives, supra note 2, at 354 n.19. Both Birnbaum and Twerski cite Tabert as a
"combined standard" that employs consumer expectations as well as a retrospective negligence approach.

19851

Design Defect Test

the factors presented in Tabert.3 4
B.

Conner v. Skagit Corp.: Departurefrom Balancing

In Conner v. Skagit Corp.,5 decided in 1983, the Washington State Supreme Court held that when a plaintiff limits allegations of unreasonable dangerousness to only one of the factors
listed in Tabert, "he must establish that single factor beyond
the balance of probabilities.""I The Conner court thus impliedly
held that a plaintiff could maintain a design defect strict liability cause of action with proof of only one of the factors set forth
in Tabert. While the posture of the case is helpful for understanding this outcome, it does not justify a holding that cripples
the risk-utility balancing approach articulated in Tabert.
Barry Conner was a logger employed by the Hammer Logging Company. In the fall of 1974, a piece of logging machinery
amputated Conner's left arm. Conner brought a design defect
products liability action against the manufacturers of the
machinery, Skagit Corporation and Bendix Corporation. The
jury held for the defendant, 7 and Conner appealed, challenging
the court's instruction on his burden of proof.3 8
The instruction required the jury to find that Conner had
proved three propositions for liability: first, that the product was
dangerous beyond reasonable consumer expectations; second,
that the design defect was the proximate cause of Conner's
injury; and finally, that an alternative design existed that "more
likely than not, would have prevented the accident."39 Conner's
34. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d at 154, 542 P.2d at 779. Beasley describes the design defect
test in Washington, under Tabert, as follows: "The reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer are determined by engaging in a cost-benefit Wade balancing test .
BEASLEY, supra note 3, at 230. See also infra note 57.
35. 99 Wash. 2d 709, 664 P.2d 1208 (1983).
36. Id. at 716-17, 664 P.2d at 1212-13.
37. Conner v. Skagit Corp., No. 82-4614, slip op. (Super. Ct. for King County, Wash.
Apr. 25, 1979).
38. At the court of appeals, Conner challenged a number of the trial court's instructions. Conner v. Skagit Corp., 30 Wash. App. 725, 638 P.2d 115 (1981). In his petition for
review to the Washington State Supreme Court, Conner challenged instruction 12, burden of proof, and instruction 14, assumption of risk. Conner, 99 Wash. 2d at 713, 664
P.2d at 1210. The controversial portion of the supreme court's opinion, and the crux of
this Comment, concerns the treatment of the burden of proof issue.
39. The verbatim instructions are set out in Conner v. Skagit Corp., 30 Wash. App.
725, 727-28, 638 P.2d 115, 117-18 (1981):
The first assignment of error is the giving of instruction 12:
The plaintiff has the burden of proof on each of the following allegations
claiming defective design on the part of the defendants:
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primary assignment of error concerned the relationship between
the first and third points of this instruction. Conner argued that
the first point, reasonable consumer expectations, was the sole
test for design defect in Washington and that the third point,
alternative design, was merely one factor that could be considered within the design defect consumer expectations test.4
The Washington State Supreme Court, while recognizing
that the consumer expectations test consists of multiple factors,
concluded that when a plaintiff brings allegations of only one
factor within that test the plaintiff must then prove the existence of that factor "beyond the balance of the probabilities" in
order to sustain the burden of proof.4 1 The court stated as
follows:
In the present case, however, plaintiff chose not to rely on such
other factors. Instead, he expressly limited his allegations to
the existence of alternative designs . . . . If he seeks to meet
[his] burden by establishing only one of the several factors contemplated by Tabert, it follows that he must establish that single factor beyond the balance of the probabilities. Plaintiff
therefore had the burden of proving the availability of a safer
design.4
Justice Dore, dissenting, asserted that the plaintiff carried
his burden of proof under the traditional consumer expectations
First, that the yarder and tower manufactured by the defendants were
designed in such a manner as to expose persons working near the equipment to
hazards or dangers which were greater than would be reasonably contemplated
or recognized by persons working in the logging industry in western Washington and possessing the ordinary knowledge of persons so employed as to the

characteristics of said equipment.
Second, that the alleged defective design was a proximate cause of injuries
sustained by the plaintiff on September 13, 1974.
Third, that there was available to the defendants a feasible and practical
alternate design which, more likely than not, would have prevented the accident which resulted in plaintiffs injuries.
If you find that the plaintiff has not sustained his burden of proof on any
one or more of these propositions, your verdict must be for the defendants.
40. Conner, 99 Wash. 2d at 713, 664 P.2d at 1211. The Conner court stated as
follows:
Plaintiff argues that this instruction increased his burden of proof by elevating
the availability of feasible alternative design to an element of the cause of
action. He argues that alternative design is merely one of a number of factors
which the jury may consider in determining whether a product is unreasonably
dangerous.
Id.
41. 99 Wash. 2d at 716-17, 664 P.2d at 1212-13.
42. Id.
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test for design defect, but was denied recovery because of the
majority's erroneous expansion of that burden. 3 Justice Dore
stated that the majority was wrong when it concluded that Conner limited his allegations to only one factor within the Tabert
test.4 ' The dissent pointed to numerous instances in the record
where plaintiff's witnesses raised such issues as gravity of harm,
cost of the product, and safety.' 5
Yet neither the majority nor the dissent asked one important question: Why was Conner allowed to maintain his case if
he had only offered proof of one of the Tabert factors? This
raises the doctrinal question whether a consumer expectations/
risk-utility test for design defect can operate effectively if only
one factor is presented to the jury. The Conner court seemed to
assume that such a limitation of the Tabert design defect test
was proper. If a design defect plaintiff relies on only one of the
Tabert factors, however, should not that plaintiff be met with a
motion for a directed verdict? The case law and policies of strict
products liability suggest so.
C.

The Balancing Requirement of Tabert and Its Progeny
1.

Washington Cases Since Tabert

The Tabert court advanced explicit reasons for its determination that the jury in design defect cases must weigh a variety
of factors. The court required that the jury consider "a number
of factors"'

6

because the court recognized that every product is

different and, therefore, every product presents a unique risk.'
A design defect test must be sufficiently flexible to allow for
application in diverse situations. 8 The court emphasized that
43. Id. at 723, 664 P.2d at 1216 (Dore, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 719, 664 P.2d at 1214 (Dore, J., dissenting) ("The majority assumes the
plaintiff chose not to rely on any of the other factors listed in Tabert. The record simply
does not support this conclusion.").
45. Id. at 721-23, 664 P.2d at 1215-16 (Dore, J., dissenting).
46. 86 Wash. 2d at 154, 542 P.2d at 779. See Note, Relevance of Industry Custom in
Strict Product Liability, 60 WASH. L. REV. 195 (1984).
47. Id. The court illustrated that expectations and hazards can differ from product
to product. The court explained that consumers would not expect the same degree of
safety in a Volkswagen as they would in an expensive Cadillac. The court, before requiring that multiple factors be considered, stated that "[tihis evaluation of the product in
terms of the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer allows the trier of fact to
take into account the intrinsic nature of the product." Id.
48. Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict
Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 838-39 (1976) (discussing the
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"[ilt must be borne in mind that we are dealing with a relative,
not an absolute concept.""9 Moreover, the court recognized that,
in some situations, reliance on the articulated factors still may
not provide the jury with an adequate basis from which to determine consumer expectations.5 To construe the Tabert standard
as allowing the plaintiff the option to rely on a proof consisting
of a single factor would defeat the goals of the multi-factor
approach. A test that considers multiple factors is more durable,
accurate, and flexible than a test that assesses consumer expectations after analyzing only a single factor.
Conner interrupted a string of post-Tabert cases that had
followed the Tabert rule.51 Tabert's progeny generally quoted
the multi-factor requirement directly or noted that the plaintiff
actually offered proof of a number of relevant factors.52
Just two months before Conner, the Washington Court of
Appeals discussed the Tabert test for consumer expectations in
Giordano v. McNeilab, Inc.5 s In Giordano, the court explained
"need for flexibility" and explaining that the policies of strict liability are not promoted
by "facile tests for determining liability").
49. 86 Wash. 2d at 154, 542 P.2d at 779.
50. Id. ("[in] other instances the nature of the product or the nature of the claimed
defect may make other factors relevant to the issue").
51. E.g., Little v. PPG Indus., 92 Wash. 2d 118, 122-23, 594 P.2d 911, 914 (1979)
(quoting the multi-factor test directly from Tabert); Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
91 Wash. 2d 345, 351, 588 P.2d 1346, 1349-50 (1979) (court reworded the standard,
affirming that multiple factors are required and stated that "a trier of fact must consider, along with the intrinsic nature of the product, a number of factors"); Ryder v.
Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 91 Wash. 2d 111, 118, 587 P.2d 160, 164 (1978) (court relied
on Tabert in stating that "fiun determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary
consumer, a number of factors must be considered"); Wagner v. Flightcraft, Inc., 31
Wash. App. 558, 565, 643 P.2d 906, 910-11 (1982) ("Through such testimony, the jury
considered the relevant factors about the ... design such as the product's utility, safety
aspects, available alternatives, feasibility of eliminating unsafe characteristics, feasibility
of spreading potential losses, the user's ability to avoid danger, and the user's anticipated awareness of the product's inherent dangers."); Bich v. General Elec. Co., 27
Wash. App. 25, 32, 614 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1980) (court cited the Tabert standard); Novak
v. Piggly Wiggly Puget Sound Co., 22 Wash. App. 407, 410, 591 P.2d 791, 794 (1979)
("This definition has been adopted by our Supreme Court, which has stated that the
reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer are determined by considering such
factors as ....").
52. See supra note 51. Research has not located any Washington case, other than
Conner, in which the plaintiff attempted to prevail in a design defect cause of-action
while relying on proof of only one of the Tabert factors.
53. 35 Wash. App. 221, 224, 666 P.2d 384, 385-86 (1983). In Giordano, the defendant
moved for summary judgment, but the court found a genuine issue of material fact:
whether the product was unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 223, 666 P.2d at 385. The court
then set out the test for consumer expectations, emphasizing the requirement of multiple
factors. The product in Giordano was a glass ampule used to store and preserve medica-
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that the consumer expectations test must take into consideration the "intrinsic nature of the product," 5" and emphasized that
an evaluation of a number of factors, as stated in Tabert, was
the required test.5 The court noted that the post-Tabert decisions required consideration of a "number of factors."' 0
2.

Judicial and Academic Commentary

The vast majority of commentators have recommended the
multi-factor approach. 7 Professor Wade has advanced the
tion prior to injection.
54. Giordano, 35 Wash. App. at 224, 666 P.2d at 385 (quoting Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d
at 154, 542 P.2d at 779). See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
55. 35 Wash. App. at 224, 666 P.2d at 385-86.
56. Id. (quoting Lamon v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 91 Wash. 2d 345, 351, 588 P.2d
1346, 1349-50 (1979); Wagner v. Flightcraft, Inc., 31 Wash. App. 558, 565, 643 P.2d 906,
910-11 (1982); Bernal v. American Honda Motor Co., 87 Wash. 2d 406, 411, 553 P.2d 107,
110 (1976)).
57. See Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products,44 Miss. L.J. 825
(1973), in which Professor Wade articulated the following factors for design defect
analysis:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and
to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury,
and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need
and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its
utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the
product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product
and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by
setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id. at 837-38. The Wade factors have been commonly cited as the definitive standard or
as authority for creative modification by the courts and commentators.
See also Fisher, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339
(1974). Fisher concurs that a number of factors should be considered and lists the relevant facts that he would analyze:
In deciding when to impose strict liability courts should consider, in light of
the facts of the particular case, the merits of the policies underlying strict liability and balance these considerations against countervailing factors. Some of
the factors that should be considered are as follows:
I. Risk Spreading
A. From the point of view of consumer.
1. Ability of consumer to bear loss.
2. Feasibility and effectiveness of self-protective measures.
a. Knowledge of risk.
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notion that a balancing test is the proper tool for establishing
some measure of "fairness" in the tension between the interests
of the consumer and the interests of the manufacturer." In
addition, balancing is the method adopted by a majority of jurisdictions for determining the safeness of a product. 59 By its very
b. Ability to control danger.
c. Feasibility of deciding against use of product.
B. From point of view of manufacturer.
1. Knowledge of risk.
2. Accuracy of prediction of losses.
3. Size of losses.
4. Availability of insurance.
5. Ability of manufacturer to self-insure.
6. Effect of increased prices on industry.
7. Public necessity for the product.
8. Deterrent effect on the development of new products.
II. Safety Incentive
A. Likelihood of future product improvement.
B. Existence of additional precautions that can presently be taken.
C. Availability of safer substitutes.
Id. at 359. See also Montgomery & Owen, supra note 48, at 818 (proposing four factors
to guide the determination of strict liability in cases involving the manufacture and sale
of injury-producing products).
For a discussion of cases and jurisdictions that have expressly adopted the Wade
balancing test see BEASLEY, supra note 3, at 211-71. See also Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or.
457, 525 P.2d 125 (1974) (applying the 7 Wade factors); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g
Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978) (adopting the Wade balancing test); Turner v.
General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974) (setting forth the balancing
test approach).
58. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV.
551 (1980). Wade asks: "Further, what should be the test, if one seeks objectively to find
a fair balance between the conflicting interests of the manufacturer (or other supplier)
and the consumer (or other injured party)?" Id. at 566. "Clearly, safety must be a relative matter, and a balancing process of some sort is necessary to determine whether a
product is sufficiently safe-regardless of whether the suit is in negligence or in strict
liability." Id. at 568. "[A] coherent analysis in design defect cases requires a balancing
process." Id. at 570.
See also R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (1983). The author notes the
proper interpretation regarding the use of Wade's factors: "Thus, in perhaps the most
influential account of product defect in design cases, that of Professor Wade, we are told
" Id. at 77-78 (emphasis added).
to take into account all of the following factors ....
59. See Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations:Enhancing the Role
of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 861 (1983), in
which Professor Twerski states that "[tihere is a broad-based consensus among courts
that in most cases risk-utility analysis must be utilized to establish the standard of product quality." Id. at 895. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (balancing test is one alternative test for determining design
defects); Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971) (balancing test combined with comment i approach); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So.
2d 113 (Miss. 1966) (balancing test for design defects), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967).
See also supra note 57 and cases cited therein.
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nature, the balancing inquiry seeks to locate a fair level of
expected product safety."e
A risk-utility balancing test simply cannot perform its
intended function when, as in Conner, only one of the many factors is argued by the plaintiff. How can a balancing occur when
only one factor is placed on the scale? What is even more surprising in Conner is that the factor relied upon by the plaintiff is
the one that has received widespread criticism as insufficient
standing alone. 6 An allegation of design defect that consists
solely of the possibility of a feasible alternative, without discussing risk, harm, or cost, presents a vague and polycentric 2 question.6 3 One commentator has noted that "[w]hat constitutes a
feasible alternative is conceptually unclear . . . and courts in
their confusion have allowed spurious claims to reach the
jury. ' 64 Professor Epstein has suggested that an allegation of an
alternative design should not, by itself, raise a jury question as
to the existence of a design defect.6 5 Professor Twerski has
raised this same point in the context of the National Products
Commentators agree. See Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective
Product Design: Toward the Preservationof An Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV.
773, 779 (1979) ("In the judgment of most post-Cronin commentators, the only intelligent approach to the issue of defective product design involves cost-benefit analysis.").
See also Henderson's list of cases and articles that support the cost-benefit approach. Id.
at 775 n.10.
60. Id. at 892. Twerski explains that "[tihe essence of risk-utility analysis is the
balancing and weighing of various considerations so that a composite judgment can be
made as to whether the product as designed embodied 'excessive preventable danger.'"
Id.
61. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
62. See Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices:
The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1534-42 (1973), in which Professor
Henderson devotes a substantial portion of his article to an analysis of polycentricity in
product liability litigation. Henderson states that "polycentric problems are many-centered problems, in which each point for decision is related to all the others as are the
strands of a spider web. If one strand is pulled, the relationships among all the strands
will again be readjusted." Id. at 1536. Thus, a lawyer who attempts to rely on one strand
for the basis of an argument "would find his arguments regarding the earlier points shifting beneath him." Id.
63. See Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra note 5, at 551-53.
64. Henderson, Manufacturers'Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed
Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. REV. 625, 636 (1978).
65. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 80. Professor Epstein agrees that design defect
cases cannot proceed with evidence of only one factor. Significantly, the factor that
Epstein cites as insufficient standing alone is alternative design, the same factor held to
be sufficient in Conner. Epstein discusses Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d
1065 (1976), and states that the court showed a "commendable display of good sense" in
determining that a "court need not treat the possibility of alternative design as raising a
triable issue on the defect question." R. EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 80.
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Liability Act, explaining that "a design alternative shall not be
adequate to establish a case for design defect" unless such other
factors, like utility, cost, and added safety benefits, are taken
into consideration as well."6
In sum, each proposed design defect test contemplates the
balancing of a number of factors.6 7 A common ingredient is the
consideration of the probability of harm and utility of the
design. 8 The Conner approach has strayed from the decisions in
Washington, the comprehensive treatment by commentators,
and the decisions in other jurisdictions. Washington courts
should now move to promote a higher-quality proof by plaintiffs
in design defect litigation.
III. PROMOTING QUALITY PROOF IN DESIGN DEFECT LITIGATION:
DIRECTED VERDICTS WHEN PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO MEET THE
Tabert STANDARD

A.

Directed Verdicts

Courts traditionally direct a verdict in favor of the defendant when the plaintiff has not met the required burden of
proof6 9 and when reasonable minds could not differ that the
defendant is entitled to judgment. 70 In a products liability context, it has been said that when the "evidence clearly compels
the conclusion that the utility of safety improvements is plainly
outweighed by their disutility," the case should be dismissed or
a directed verdict should be entered for the manufacturer.7"
Similarly, one commentator has suggested that a court must
weigh at least ten factors to determine whether the plaintiff has
66. Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra note 5, at 555.
67. See Keeton, Product Liability-DesignHazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10
CuM. L. REV. 293, 313-14 (1979) (proposing a risk-utility balancing test that analyzes a
number of interests, particularly the magnitude of danger and the utility of the design);
Twerski, supra note 59, at 895-96 (emphasizing the likelihood of injury). See also supra
notes 57 & 59.
68. See supra note 67.
69. See, e.g., Amsbury v. Cowles Publishing Co., 76 Wash. 2d 733, 735, 458 P.2d 882,
883 (1969) (directed verdict is proper procedural tool to remove an issue from the jury's
consideration); Hemmen v. Clark's Restaurant Enters., 72 Wash. 2d 690, 691, 434 P.2d
729, 731 (1967) (motion that challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, for a directed
verdict, admits the truth of the opponent's evidence); Osborn v. Lake Wash. School Dist.
No. 414, 1 Wash. App. 534, 535, 462 P.2d 966, 968 (1969) (trial court must interpret
evidence most favorably to nonmoving party). See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 95 (4th
ed. 1983); WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 50.
70. See supra note 69.
71. Montgomery & Owen, supra note 48, at 833.
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presented "sufficient evidence of defect to give [the case] to the
jury.''72 The general view is that if a design defect claim goes to
the jury on "thin liability facts," victims will be given awards
based on jury sympathy rather than on evidence. 7"
Some design defect cases may present issues of such
extreme complexity, calling for levels of competence not possessed by juries, that a directed verdict would be an appropriate
response.74 The problem is simpler, however, when the plaintiff
has offered insufficient proof. A design defect plaintiff should
suffer a directed verdict if the plaintiff's proofs do not offer sufficient evidence to allow the jury to balance and weigh adequately
the required factors articulated in the risk-utility test.
The balancing approach in the risk-utility test was developed because of the fundamental inefficiencies of a pure consumer expectations standard. That is, who could ever assess
what consumers expect, in terms of product safety, without a
balancing of risk and utility? 75 Accordingly, if a jury does not
72. Vandall, "Design Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and
Strict Liability, 43 OHIO ST.L.J. 61, 83-84 (1982) (recommending 10 factors for the court
to consider, each very similar to those utilized by the jury in determining the existence of
a defect).
73. Schwartz, Foreword: UnderstandingProducts Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435,
470 (1979). See Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law,
58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 796, 850 ("directed verdict device . . .dissuades plaintiffs with marginal claims from suing").
74. See generally Henderson, JudicialReview of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLum. L. REv. 1531 (1973); Twerski, supra
note 59, at 862-69; Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground, supra note 5, at 552-53.
75. Professor Keeton has criticized the theory of a consumer expectations test for
design defect. Keeton, supra note 67, at 302-03. Keeton cites three main reasons for the
inaccuracy of consumer expectations as a test for design defect: "First, a victim could
never recover for harm suffered as a result of a design hazard that was open and obvious
or one with respect to which the purchaser was adequately informed." Id. at 302. "Secondly, this test can result in the identification of products as being dangerously defective
when clearly they are not so." Id. at 303. "Thirdly, underlying the test is the fallacious
assumption that the ordinary purchaser has definite expectations regarding the dangerousness of the products purchased. This is not so." Id. See Birnbaum, supra note 33, at
614-16. Professor Birnbaum criticizes the design defect test that relies on consumer
expectations:
That is, in seeking to establish that a product is dangerous to an extent beyond
that which the ordinary consumer would expect, the trier of fact must first
determine what reasonable consumer expectations would be. Under a literal
application of comment i, the trier of fact would be invited to rely on some
vague commonsense notion of what the ordinary consumer expects in the way
of safety. The court would offer no guidelines to help the trier of fact in making this crucial determination. Nonetheless, by grounding the comment i test
on a risk-utility base, some courts have recognized the need to define for the
jury exactly which factors should be considered in discerning what the objec-
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receive a "quality proof," one that enables the jury to perform
the risk-utility weighing test, then the test is crippled, and the
jury cannot achieve an accurate estimate of product safety or
consumer expectations.
Recent state supreme court decisions in New Jersey and
Oregon have set forth rules designed to ensure that a design
defect plaintiff presents a "quality proof." These decisions confirm that a plaintiff should not be allowed to reach the jury with
a design defect claim unless evidence of a number of relevant
factors has been presented. In O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.,e the
New Jersey Supreme Court stated that "[in a design-defect
case, the plaintiff bears the burden of both going forward with
the evidence and of persuasion that the product contained a
defect. To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff should
adduce sufficient evidence on the risk-utility factors to estab77
lish a defect."
Similarly, in Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,78 the Oregon
Supreme Court reaffirmed its position that a trial court should
not allow design defect claims based upon insufficient evidence
to reach the jury. The court explained that a trial court should
perform its own balancing test, stating that "the court should
balance the utility of the risk and its magnitude in deciding
tive ordinary consumer expects ....
Burdening a product defect analysis with the conceptual baggage of the
hypothetical ordinary consumer adds essentially nothing of substance to a
straightforward risk-utility balancing approach . . . .In other words, to determine if a product is unsafe beyond the ordinary consumer's contemplation, the
trier of fact must first decide what this hypothetical ordinary consumer would
reasonably contemplate. To do this, the trier of fact must balance the various
risk-utility factors involved. The conclusions drawn from this weighing of factors is then said to constitute the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer . . . . With a single-standard test, however, there is the danger that
these considerations will improperly infect the balancing test with notions of
implied assumption of risk where a patent design defect is at issue.
Id.
See also Keeton, supra note 67, at 302-04 (consumer expectations test inconclusive
as to whether person in fact weighed utility against danger); Rheingold, What Are the
Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations'?, 22 Bus. LAW. 589, 593 (1967) (test based on
consumer expectations is imprecise and will require case-by-case analysis); Schwartz,
supra note 73, at 475-81 (consumer expectation standard is unable to stand on its own in
difficult cases); Twerski, supra note 59, at 895-908 (courts must be careful to screen out
weak claims based on consumer expectations).
76. 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
77. Id. at 185, 463 A.2d at 306 (emphasis added).
78. 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1977), reh'g denied, 282 Or. 411, 579 P.2d 1287
(1978).
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whether to submit a design defect case to the jury . . . . The
trial court should not permit an allegation of design defect
unless there is sufficient evidence upon which to make this
determination. '79 The Oregon Supreme Court emphasized that,
in many instances, a claim of a safer alternative design should
not go to the jury unless there is sufficient evidence of other relevant factors such as cost, feasibility, practicability, and general
utility.8 0 The court stated that "[i]t is part of the required proof
that a design feature is a 'defect' to present such evidence."'"
B.

Statutory Reform

In 1981 the Washington State Legislature reformed the
state's products liability law. 2 A significant debate has commenced regarding the extent to which the Tabert factors should
be balanced under the new test for design defect.8 3 The statute
79. Id. at 67-68, 577 P.2d at 1326.
80. Id. at 69, 577 P.2d at 1327.
81. Id.
82. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 7.72 (1983). For a discussion of the products liability statutes in Washington State, see Talmadge, Tort and Product Liability Reform, 5 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 1 (1981); Comment, Products Liability-Tort Reform: An Overview of
Washington's New Act, 17 GONZ. L. REV. 357 (1981); Comment, Product Liability
Reform Proposals in Washington-A Public Policy Analysis, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV.
143 (1980).
83. Compare the majority opinion in Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wash. 2d
208, 214-15, 683 P.2d 1097, 1098 (1984) with Justice Dimmick's dissenting opinion in
that same case, 102 Wash. 2d at 215-19, 683 P.2d at 1101-03 (Dimmick, J., dissenting).
Justice Brachtenbach, speaking for the majority, stated that:
One of the more significant changes adopted by the Legislature was to change
the standard of liability for design . . .defects. The Legislature felt that the
balancing factors announced in Tabert. . .had implicitly created a negligence
standard for strict liability causes of action. Therefore, the Legislature adopted
negligence standards as the standard of liability for design . . .defects under
the new act.
102 Wash. 2d at 214, 683 P.2d at 1101.
Justice Dimmick, dissenting, strongly disagreed and explained why the new act still
requires the Tabert balancing test:
In defining "unreasonably unsafe" in product design cases, the Legislature purported to make explicit the balancing test that was implicitly followed under
strict liability law. Final Report, at 17-18. The Washington State Senate's
Select Committee on Tort and Product Liability Reform expressed the view
that, in balancing various factors, the trier of fact should take into account the
greatest amount of evidence available. Final Report, at 39-40. This policy judgment makes good sense whether considering product liability under case law or
the new act. I see no reason to strain the rationale of our prior cases, and now
disavow the balancing test of Tabert, to reach a result contrary to the product
liability act.
The new product liability act retained the consumer expectations test as a
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provides the following test for design defect:
(1) A product manufacturer is subject to liability to a
claimant if the claimant's harm was proximately caused by the
negligence of the manufacturer in that the product was not
reasonably safe as designed or not reasonably safe because adequate warnings or instructions were not provided.
(a) A product is not reasonably safe as designed, if, at the
time of manufacture, the likelihood that the product would
cause the claimant's harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those harms, outweighed the burden on the manufacturer to design a product that would have prevented those
harms and the adverse effect that an alternative design that
was practical and feasible would have on the usefulness of the
product.
(3) In determining whether a product was not reasonably
safe under this section, the trier of fact shall consider whether
the product was unsafe to an extent beyond that which would
be contemplated by the ordinary consumer. 4
The new statute should be interpreted to include the Tabert
test. Subsection (3) is the same consumer expectations test
articulated by the court in Tabert. 5 Moreover, both the legislative history"6 and the official Senate Committee Report 7 specify
factor in determining liability for design defect because it was believed to be
harmonious with the act's balancing test used for determining reasonable
safety. Final Report, at 35-36. Our decisions support that legislative judgment.
Under Tabert, determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer requires balancing various factors such as the product's cost, the gravity
of harm, and the cost and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk to
the consumer. . . . Because the function of this balancing is to evaluate the
reasonableness of the degree of safety the product possesses to the ordinary
user, the test is comparable to a negligence analysis ...
This balancing of risk and utility in a strict liability case does not transform strict liability into negligence.
102 Wash. 2d at 216-17, 683 P.2d at 1102 (Dimmick, J., dissenting).
84. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.72.030(1)(a), (3) (1983).
85. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
86. See SENATE JOURNAL, 47TH LEGISLATURE 631 (1981). After discussing criticism of
the Tabert test, the report explains that the
UPLA adopts a test which balances the likelihood and seriousness of the harm
against the burden to produce a safer product and the effect of such a design
on the usefulness of the product. Factors examined under such a balancing test
are similar to those suggested by the Washington Court in analyzing the consumer expectation test, Seattle-First National Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d
145 (1975), and therefore can be harmonized with the consumer expectation
test. Thus, both tests are adopted here as relevant considerations which the
trier of fact should consider.
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expressly that the Tabert consumer expectations test is to be
included in the statute.18 The statute clearly provides for a riskutility balancing under both section (1)(a) and section (3).89
While the statute does not address the question of directed
verdicts when a plaintiff fails to establish a proof that raises the
multiple factors, it does urge that plaintiffs present to the jury
as much evidence as is available.90 The statute states that industry custom, technological feasibility, and private or public regulatory standards are all relevant to the jury's consideration. 1
The legislative history stresses that this section encourages "the
greatest amount of evidence available" in order for the jury to
demonstrate its "inherent ability . . . to reach a just conclusion." 92 Thus, the premise of the legislature is the same as that
developed under the case law and in the commentaries: a jury
needs to balance a variety of factors, not just one, in order to
reach an accurate decision regarding the existence of a design
defect.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A design defect test that requires comprehensive information regarding a broad range of relevant factors is a test that will
assist the trier of fact in accurately assessing the existence of a
design defect. When a jury is asked to make the nebulous determination whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, the jury
should have more than one factor to balance and weigh. Until
Conner, Washington law required consideration of "a number of
factors."9 3 The history and policies of design defect/strict liability litigation suggest that it would be best to move away from
Conner and toward directed verdicts in favor of defendants
when plaintiffs fail to provide a quality proof under the Tabert
test.
Joshua J. Preece

Id. (emphasis added).
87. See WASHINGTON

STATE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TORT & PRODUCT LIABIL-

36 (1981).
88. Justice Dimmick raised this point in her dissenting opinion. Lenhardt v. Ford
Motor Co., 102 Wash. 2d 208, 215, 683 P.2d 1097, 1101 (1984) (Dimmick, J., dissenting).
89. See supra note 84.
90. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.050 (1983).
91. Id.
92. SENATE JOURNAL, 47TH LEGISLATURE 632 (1981).
93. 86 Wash. 2d at 154, 542 P.2d at 779.
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